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TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS-AN ANALYSIS OF
VIRGINIA'S STATUTE
I. INTRODUCTION
The act of terminating parental rights-the total and permanent sever-
ance of the parent-child relationship-is an example of extreme interven-
tion by the state in an individual's private interests. It involves the com-
plex interrelations of a trilogy: the parents' natural rights, the child's
personal interests, and the state's interest in the welfare of its citizens.
Historically, the child was the absolute property of his father. Child
abuse in its most extreme forms (infanticide and abandonment) was a
common and accepted occurrence.1 By the early 1700's; this patriarchal
model was altered with the introduction of the doctrine of parens pa-
triae.2 Under this doctrine, the state, as protector and guardian of the
child's best interest, justified and today continues to justify its interven-
tion into a parent's control over his child. Nonetheless, under early En-
glish common law, the custody right of the father continued to be abso-
lute in- most instances.- When transported to this country, the English
common law was transformed from an absolute custody right in the fa-
ther to a custody right "interrelated with his duty to provide support";"
and, while the father's custody right was superior to the mother's, cus-
tody passed to her at his death.
While early common law of the United States tempered parental rights
with parental responsibilities, the courts and public authorities did not
begin to intervene in family life to protect children from parental neglect
1. For an excellent discussion of the historic maltreatment of children, see Thomas, Child
Abuse and Neglect Part I: Historical Overview, Legal Matrix, and Social Perspectives, 50
N.C.L. REv. 293 (1972).
2. Parens patriae, literally "parent of the country," had its origin in the eighteenth cen-
tury English Court of Chancery which recognized that the King had a duty to protect every
subject who was incapable of self-protection. Mental incompetents and infants were in-
cluded in this category. See Eyre v. Shaftbury, 24 Eng. Rep. 659 (Ch. 1722).
The doctrine's early application was limited to protecting the child's interest in real prop.
erty from misappropriation by a testamentary guardian or father. E.g., Wellesley v.
Beaufort, 38 Eng. Rep. 236 (1827). See also Note, Termination of Parental Rights and the
Lesser Restrictive Alternative Doctrine, 12 TuLSA L.J. 528, 529-30 n.10 (1977)[hereinafter
cited as Termination].
3. "Despite the extension of the parens patriae doctrine in the Court of Chancery, courts
of law in England continued to recognize the parent's right absolute to the child" for some
time. See De Manneville v. De Manneville, 32 Eng. Rep. 762 (Ch. 1804). Termination, supra
note 2, at 530 n.10.
4. Thomas, supra note 1, at 299.
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and abuse until the nineteenth century.' These early efforts were directed
toward preventing the neglected or abused child from a future life of
crime, thereby reflecting a possibly greater concern for protection of soci-
ety than for protection of the child.
By the twentieth century, this "preventive" philosophy had given way
to concern for "the best interests of the child" interlaced with a pre-
sumption that such interest lay with custody in the natural parent. In
balancing the rights of parents, child, and state, the courts found this
presumptive parental right could be forfeited through voluntary agree-
ment, abandonment or parental unfitness.7 The parents no longer had a
property or absolute right to custody of their child.8
Today, although a few courts have discounted biological parenthood
and have looked instead to the psychological parent in determining cus-
tody or termination matters,9 the prevailing view continues to center on a
rebuttable presumption that the best interests of the child are served by
custody with the natural parents.10 Also the common law vestiture of pa-
rental rights in the father is currently giving way to equal rights of both
5. Id. at 306.
6. Under the "best interest of the child" concept, "the court should ideally give primary
attention to the child's individual needs." Note, Termination of Parental Rights - Sug-
gested Reforms and Responses, 16 J. F ,s. L. 239, 243 (1977-78). However, in practice, the
child's interests are often subordinated to parental rights. See generally J. GOLDSTEIN, A.
FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 4, 54 (1973).
See also Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925), an early case recognizing
"the best interests of the child" doctrine.
7. A great deal of ambiguity exists in the term "unfitness." The meaning has ranged from
moral delinquency (e.g., Rogers v. Commonwealth, 176 Va. 355, 11 S.E.2d 584 (1940)) to
lack of ability (e.g., In re McDonald, 201 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 1972)) to unwillingness or indif-
ference (e.g., In re Jones, 59 Misc. 2d 69, 297 N.Y.S.2d 675 (1969)). See also Leavell, Cus-
tody Disputes and the Proposed Model Act, 2 GA. L. REV. 162, 176-78 (1968).
8. Cf. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (while recognizing the private realm of
family life, the Court also stated that the rights of parenthood may be limited).
9. A psychological parent has been defined as "one who, on a continuing, day-to-day ba-
sis, through interaction, companionship, interplay, and mutuality, fulfills the child's psycho-
logical needs for a parent, as well as the child's physical needs." J. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6,
at 98. See also Hoy v. Willis, 165 N.J. Super. 265, 398 A.2d 109 (1978) (although there was
no finding of parental unfitness or abandonment, the court awarded custody to the foster
mother who had become the child's psychological parent). This case was a custody rather
than a termination decision. A finding of severe harm to the child's development or parental
unfitness would be required in a termination decision.
10. E.g., In re Atwood, 2 Kan. App. 2d 680, 587 P.2d 1 (1978); Rocka v. Roanoke County
Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 215 Va. 515, 211 S.E.2d 76 (1975); Judd v. Van Horn, 195 Va. 988, 81
S.E.2d 432 (1954) (although a custody matter rather than termination of parental rights, the
court noted the presumption that the child's best interests are served in custody of its natu-
ral parents).
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parents. 1
The broad and ambiguous concept of "best interests of the child," with
its presumptive preference for natural parents' custody rights, was criti-
cally examined during the last two decades. The use of x-ray technology
exposed many incidents of child abuse and heightened public awareness
of the extent of the problem. In response to public pressure, state legisla-
tures undertook major reforms of their child neglect and abuse statutes.
These reforms included statutory authorization, often for the first time,
of the termination of parental rights. By 1977, nearly every state had a
statute under which parental rights may be terminated.
12
This article will trace the development of the trilogy of parent, child,
and state interests in Virginia case law, 13 which set the stage for Vir-
ginia's first statutory termination of parental rights in 1960.1' An analysis
of Virginia's current statute5 will be undertaken by comparing two model
termination of parental rights statutes and by drawing upon recent cases
challenging the constitutionality of such statutes. This article addresses
the termination of parental rights only for reasons of neglect, abuse and
abandonment, and does not consider terminations arising from divorce or
from adoption proceedings, for which other statutes are provided.
II. THE CASE LAW IN VIRGINIA - A PRECURSOR OF THE STATUTORY
STANDARDS FOR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
In dealing with the triadic interests of parent, child, and state, much of
Virginia's case law applies to contested custody rights between natural
parents and third parties and does not consider the termination of par-
ents' rights. The cases are nevertheless relevant because the courts, in
assessing the relative interests of the affected parties, treat the two situa-
tions similarly.' 6 These court developed custody concepts were explicitly
incorporated within Virginia's first termination statute.
17
11. 59 Am. JUL. 2d Parent and Child § 11 (1971).
12. See Termination, supra note 2, at 528 n.3 for a list of state statutes on termination of
parental rights.
13. The Virginia cases discussed infra are primarily custody and not termination situa-
tions. The custody situations chosen are those between parents and nonparents. Nonethe-
less, in balancing the interests of the child and parent or parents, the court has utilized the
same standard for both situations, i.e. the best interest of the child conditioned by the bio-
logical parent preference.
14. 1960 Va. Acts, c.331 at 392-94 (repealed 1977 Va. Acts, c.559).
15. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
16. Compare Williams v. Williams, 192 Va. 787, 66 S.E.2d 500 (1951) with Berrien v.
Greene County Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 216 Va. 241, 217 S.E.2d 854 (1975).
17. E.g., 1960 Va. Acts, c.331 at 393 permitted termination "[i]f proper studies indicate
1980]
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As early as 1886, the Virginia Supreme Court in Merritt v. Swimley18
established the rule that "the best interests of the child" is the chief con-
sideration in custody disputes between natural parents and third par-
ties.19 However, a strong presumption continued that the best interests of
the child rested in his custody with a natural parent.2 0 The state, as
parens patriae, would interfere with parental rights to custody only upon
"strong and convincing proof'21 of voluntary surrender, abuse or parental
unfitness.2 2 Additionally, the court stated unequivocally that the parents
held no property right in their children.23 The parents' right to custody
was deemed to be a legally cognizable though limited right based "upon
natural justice and wisdom, and being essential to the peace, order, virtue
and happiness of society."' 4 Another rule specified that the wishes of the
child, while not conclusive, were entitled to consideration.2 5 These rules
continue to be followed by the Virginia courts today. They are also re-
flected in the following provisions of the termination statute: "clear and
convincing" proof is required;26 the "best interest of the child" is consid-
ered;27 parental actions which may constitute prima facie evidence of un-
fitness are specified;28 the wishes of the child are taken into account.2 9
The first Virginia statute authorizing termination of parental rights was
enacted in 1960. It stated in part: "If proper studies indicate that it is for
the child's best interest and that of the State that such child be separated
permanently from its parent . . . the order of commitment shall so
state. ... , Although the 1960 statute spoke only of "the best interest
that it is for the child's best interest ..
18. 82 Va. 433 (1886).
19. Id. at 440.
20. Id. at 436. Accord, Rocka v. Roanoke County Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 215 Va. 515, 211
S.E.2d 76 (1975); Berrien v. Greene County Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 216 Va. 241, 217 S.E.2d
854 (1975).
21. Rocka v. Roanoke County Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 215 Va. 515, 211 S.E.2d 76 (1975);
Williams v. Williams, 192 Va. 787, 66 S.E.2d 500 (1951); Sutton v. Menges, 186 Va. 805, 44
S.E.2d 414 (1947) (the evidence of unfitness must be "cogent and convincing").
22 Merritt v. Swimley, 82 Va. 433, 436 (1886).
23. Id. at 440.
24. Walker v. Brooks, 203 Va. 417, 421, 124 S.E.2d 195, 198 (1962). See also Lawson v.
Lawson, 198 Va. 403, 94 S.E.2d 215 (1956); Judd v. Van Horn, 195 Va. 988, 81 S.E.2d 432
(1954); Merritt v. Swimley, 82 Va. 433 (1886).
25. Williams v. Williams, 192 Va. 787, 66 S.E.2d 500 (1951); Sutton v. Menges, 186 Va.
805, 44 S.E.2d 414 (1947): Merritt v. Swimley, 82 Va. 433 (1886).
26. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(B) and (C)(Cum. Supp. 1980).
27. Id.
28. Id. § 16.1-283(B)(2)(a)-(c) and (C)(2)(a)-(b).
29. Id. § 16.1-283(E).
30. 1960 Va. Acts, c.331 at 393 (repealed 1977 Va. Acts, c.559).
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of the child," the Virginia Supreme Court in Rocka v. Roanoke County
Department of Public Welfare"1 and in Berrien v. Greene County De-
partment of Public Welfare12 reemphasized the presumptive parental
right by holding that the natural parent is entitled to custody of the child
unless the non-parent proves by clear and convincing evidence that the
parent is unfit and that the best interests of the child require
termination.
The 1960 statute was repealed and superseded by the present law in
1977 (as amended in 1978, 1979, and 1980) s3 after a study of the Juvenile
Code in Virginia recommended the adoption of more specific guidelines
for the termination of parental rights.3 ' The one case decided under the
current statute, Weaver v. Roanoke Department of Human Resources,6
reversed the lower court's order terminating parental rights and stressed
the court's respect for "[t]he preservation of the family and in particular
the parent-child relationship."3 Thus, up to now, the Virginia courts,
with or without a statute, have considered the best interests of the child,
but that interest is conditioned by a strong predilection for parental right
to custody.
1H. VIRGINIA'S STATUTE AND THE ABA AND JUVENILE COURT JUDGES
MODEL STATUTES - A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Virginia's present statute for the termination of parental rights reflects
in part the rules promulgated by the court in prior case law. The statute
31. 215 Va. 515, 211 S.E.2d 76 (1975). Accord, Shank v. Dep't of Social Serv., 217 Va. 506,
230 S.E.2d 454 (1976)(upholding the court's authority to terminate parental rights).
32. 216 Va. 241, 217 S.E.2d 854 (1975).
33. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
34. VIRGINIA ADVISORY LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, SERVICES TO YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS: REVISION
OF THE JUVENILE CODE, S. Doc. No. 19 at 14-15 & App. at 51-53 (1976). See also, VIRGINIA
ADVISORY LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, NEEDS OF YOUNG CHILDREN, H. Doc. No. 24 at 20-21 (1976)
and proposed legislation, id., App. at 44-46.
35. -Va -, 265 S.E.2d 692 (1980).
36. Id. at -, 265 S.E.2d at 695. The court's decision in this case dealt with the new
standards specified in § 16.1-283(C)(2). After examining the record, the court held that
while the evidence showed that Mr. Weaver had failed to remedy the conditions leading to
placement of his children, there should be no termination since the record did not indicate
the statutorily required assistance of rehabilitation agencies in such remediation. Likewise,
in reversing the termination of Mrs. Weaver's parental rights, the court concluded that even
if the mother's financial condition could be considered a factor in the children's placement,
the record indicated no offering of assistance to her in order to remedy such condition. The
court seemed to be requiring a strict and full compliance with the agency assistance provi-
sion of the statute since proof that the human resource department worked with Mr.
Weaver in setting goals for himself was not deemed a sufficient effort.
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is clothed in terms of "best interest of the child" and parental conduct.
However, as discussed below, significant changes signal an increased
awareness of the child's needs. This section will analyze the Virginia stat-
ute and then evaluate it viz-a-viz two model statutes for termination of
parental rights: those of the National Council of Juvenile Court Judges 7
and the American Bar Association."
The general purpose and intent clause governing Virginia's Juvenile
Code, and the termination provisions therein, reflect the legislative con-
cern for and support of the integrity of the family. It states in part:
"[T]he welfare of the child and the family is the paramount concern of
the State .... This law shall be interpreted and construed so as to effec-
tuate the following purpose[s]: To separate a child from such child's par-
ents... only when the child's welfare is endangered.... ."s The termi-
nation statute itself begins with a subsection granting the courts the
power to terminate residual parental rights.40 Such action must be in a
separate proceeding; it may not be part of a proceeding for neglect or
abuse.41 Furthermore, "the filing of a foster care plan, pursuant to section
37. NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE COURT JUDGES, MODEL STATUTE FOR TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL RIGHTS, reprinted in [1978 Reference File] FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 0069 (June 14,
1977) [hereinafter cited as Juv. CT. JUDGES MODEL]. See also Lincoln, Model Statute for
Termination of Parental Rights, 27 Juv. JUST. 3 (No. 4) (1976).
38. IJA-ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING TO ABUSE AND
NEGLECT 9-33, 148-63 (Tentative Draft 1977).
While the American Bar Association adopted seventeen "standards" volumes from the
Juvenile Justice Standard Project, no action has yet been taken on the standards relating to
abuse and neglect. ABA, SUMMARY OF ACTION OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 6-7 (February
1979).
See also JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS OF THE IJA-ABA, Abuse and Neglect, reprinted in
[1978] FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 3105, 3111-12 [hereinafter cited as ABA MODEL].
Although not discussed in this article, a third model act is of interest for reference pur-
poses: N. KATZ, Model Act to Free Children for Permanent Placement with Commentary,
reprinted in [Reference File] FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 201:0077.
39. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-227 (Cum. Supp. 1980) (emphasis added).
40. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(A) (Cum. Supp. 1980). Residual parental rights are defined
as "all rights and responsibilities remaining with the parent after the tranfer of legal cus-
tody or guardianship of the person, including but not limited to the right of visitation, con-
sent to adoption, the right to determine religious affiliation and the responsibility for sup-
port." Id. § 16.1-228(S).
41. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(A) (Cum. Supp. 1980). The requirement of a separate pro-
ceeding is the result of the 1980 amendment to the termination statute which became effec-
tive July 1, 1980. 1980 Va. Acts, ch. 295 at 325. It represents a significant change from the
old law which permitted a termination action in a separate proceeding or in a neglect or
abuse proceeding. 1979 Va. Acts, ch. 281. The separate proceeding provision appears to be
in conflict with the section providing for disposition upon the finding of neglect or abuse.
One disposition option is termination. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279(A)(5)(Cum. Supp. 1980).
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16.1-281, which documents termination of residual parental rights as be-
ing in the best interests of the child,"'42 is a prerequisite to the filing of a
termination petition. Provision is also made for notice of the termination
proceeding to be served upon the parents and certain foster parents.43
In subsection B, the statute provides standards permitting, but not
mandating, termination of parental rights "of a parent or parents of a
child found by the court to be neglected or abused and placed in foster
care as a result of (i) court commitment, (ii) an entrustment agreemenit
. . . or (iii) other voluntary relinquishment by the parent or parents.'
'44
These standards invoke three criteria: first, "the best interests of the
child"; second, neglect and abuse which present "a serious and substan-
tial threat to [the child's] life, health or development"; and third, that
"the conditions which resulted in such neglect or abuse" are not reasona-
bly likely to change.45 The focus on serious harm to the child represents a
significant departure from the terminology of the 1960 statute, referring
solely to "best interests of the child," and also from decisions of the
courts concerning "best interests of the child" and "unfitness" of the
parents. Although the term is not used, parental fitness seemingly re-
mains a factor in today's statutory standards. 46 However, the child is
However, any real discrepancy may be illusory as the section provides for termination pur-
suant to section 16.1-283 of the Code. Apparently, as a result of the new mandate for a
separate proceeding for termination petitions, the 1980 amendments eliminated the six
month interlocutory period previously provided in section 16.1-283(B). 1980 Va. Acts, ch.
295 at 326.
42. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(A) (Cum. Supp. 1980). This provision was added in 1980.
1980 Va. Acts, ch. 295.
43. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(A) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
44. Id. § 16.1-283(B) (emphasis added).
The 1980 Amendment added the language appearing after the conjunction, "and." 1980
Va. Acts, ch. 295. This change represents an added requirement of a foster care placement
prior to termination upon a finding of neglect or abuse. It reflects the importance which the
legislature has continued to place on the preservation of the family.
"Abused or neglected" means any child whose parents or other person responsible
for his care:
1. Creates or inflicts, threatens to create or inflict, or allows to be created or inflicted
upon such child a physical or mental injury by other than accidental means, or cre-
ates a substantial risk of death, disfigurement or impairment of bodily or mental
functions;
2. Neglects or refuses to provide care necessary for his health . .
3. Abandons such child; or
4. Commits or allows to be committed any sexual act upon a child in violation of law
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228(A) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
45. Id. § 16.1-283(B)(1)-(2).
46. The statute lists parental conduct which constitutes prima facie evidence that the
1980]
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given new and independent consideration. Evidence of an awareness of
the child's needs is present in subsection C which sets forth standards for
termination when a child is in foster care. It provides for prompt and
final determination following "parental failure, within twelve months, to
maintain contact with children or to 'remedy' within a reasonable period
the conditions that lead to placement. '47 The focus here is completely on
parental conduct, although implicitly the statute recognizes psychological
harm to the child and the child's need for continuity of relationship.48
This subsection also requires proof that appropriate and reasonable sup-
portive services have been offered to strengthen the parent-child relation-
ship. Thus, a specific duty is imposed upon the state to make every rea-
sonable effort to preserve the integrity of the family before severing all
parental rights.
Subsection D provides for termination of residual parental rights upon
the ground of abandonment when, after diligent efforts, the identity of
the parents cannot be ascertained and if, within six months of an order
placing the child in foster care, no parent, relative, or guardian comes
forth to identify such child.49 The last subsection, E, prevents termina-
tion of parental rights upon the objection of a child fourteen years of age
or older or of a younger child in the court's discretion.50 This provision is
a statutory enactment of a discretionary action long recognized by the
Virginia Supreme Court. 1 It should be emphasized that the standard of
proof required by the statute is one of "clear and convincing evidence.
'52
In addition, the child's and the parent's rights to counsel for termination
proceedings are provided for by statute.53
The Virginia statute may be compared with the model statutes as to
standards for termination, phraseology, burden of proof, right to counsel,
poverty clauses, and time considerations. The standards set forth in the
Juvenile Court Judges Model, although more extensive, parallel the Vir-
conditions related to the neglect or abuse are not reasonably likely to change. Id.
§ 16.283(B)(2)(a)-(c)(Cum. Supp. 1980). See the discussion of unfitness in Weaver v. Roa-
noke Dep't of Human Resources, -Va-., 265 S.E.2d at 696 n.5 (1980).
47. Derdeyn, Rogoff, & Williams, Alternatives to Absolute Termination of Parental
Rights After Long-Term Foster Care, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1165, 1183 (1978). See also VA.
CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(C) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
48. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
49. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(D) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
50. Id. § 16.1-283(E).
51. See Sutton v. Menges, 186 Va. 805, 44 S.E.2d 414 (1947); Merritt v. Swimley, 82 Va.
433 (1886).
52. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(B)-(C) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
53. Id. § 16.1-266.
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ginia approach in setting standards of parental conduct." Neither statute
limits the court's consideration to the standards listed. 55 In contrast, the
ABA Model enumerates standards to consider in termination proceedings
solely in terms of endangerment or detriment to the child."s No parental
conduct is mentioned. Another significant difference in the ABA Model is
that termination, although not required, is limited to the grounds listed
in the statute. 57 Both model statutes eliminate the use of the term "best
interests of the child." Virginia's statute continues to use this terminology
which is often criticized for the vagaries of its meaning.5"
Virginia's statute is the most demanding in burden of proof, requiring
"clear and convincing evidence."59 The ABA Model seems to require a
like standard, 0 while the Juvenile Court Judges Model suggests the less
exacting "preponderance of the evidence" standard.61 As to the child's
and parent's rights to representation by counsel, the model statutes and
Virginia's statute are in agreement. All provide for separate counsel for
the child and the parent or parents involved in a termination proceed-
ing.6 2 An additional consideration is provided in the ABA Model's pov-
erty or cultural differences clause, which alerts "all decisionmakers [to]
examine the child's needs in light of the child's cultural [and economic]
54. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(B)(2)(a)-(c) (Curn. Supp. 1979) with Juv. CT.
JUDGES MODEL, supra note 37, § 12(1)(a)-(g) and 2(a)-(d). Both state that the court in ter-
mination matters should consider proof of parental mental illness or mental deficiency, drug
or alcohol abuse or addiction to the extent that there is no reasonable likelihood in the
foreseeable future that such parent will have the capacity to care for the child's needs.
55. The Juv. CT. JUDGES MODEL specifially states that the court shall consider but is not
limited to the standards listed. On the other hand, the Virginia statute, by the absence of
obligatory language, fails to limit the court solely to the standards listed.
56. State v. Robert H., 118 N.H. 713, -, 393 A.2d 1387, 1389 (1978) (in supporting the
ABA MODEL's endorsement of state intervention only in terms of specific harm to the child,
the court noted that the New Hampshire statute's lack of adequate focus on specific harm
to the children carried a substantial risk of intervention to "save" children of poor parents
or minority cultures).
57. ABA MODEL, supra note 38, §§ 2.1(A)-(F) and 8.2(B). Contra, State v. Metteer, 203
Neb. 515, -, 279 N.W.2d 374, 378 (1979) (stating that a precise checklist might be more
destructive of family integrity than leaving some discretion with the court).
58. The phrase, "best interests of the child," if unfettered, means the child's needs are to
be paramount. However, in practice the child's needs have been intertwined and often sub-
jugated to "parental rights." See generally Gordon, Terminal Placement of Children and
Permanent Termination of Parental Rights, 46 ST. JOHNS L. REv. 215, 221-25 (1971).
59. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(B) and (C) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
60. See ABA MODEL, supra note 38, § 8.3(A) and (B). These subsections refer to a "clear
and convincing" burden of proof when using one of the statutory exceptions to termination.
The exceptions are listed in ABA MODEL, supra note 38, § 8.4(A)-(D).
61. Juv. CT. JUDGES MODEL, supra note 37, § 8.
62. Id. § 7; ABA MODEL, supra note 38; VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-266 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
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background."
Finally, while both model statutes require shorter periods of time to
elapse for termination on grounds of abandonment than does Virginia's
statute,6 4 the most distinctive time period differential appears in the ABA
Model. Subsections 8.3(A) and (B) provide:
A. For children who were under three at the time of placement, a court
should order termination after the child has been in placement for six
months, if the child cannot be returned home at the time...
B. For a child over three at the time of placement, the court should or-
der termination after the child has been in placement for one year if the
child cannot be returned home at that time .... 65
The Virginia statute makes no age distinctions but requires a blanket
twelve-month placement period before permitting termination of parental
rights.6 In this aspect the ABA Model exhibits a consideration for the
child's sense of time that is absent in Virginia's statute.
In summary, substantial similarities exist between the Virginia statute
and the two model statutes. All contain:
1. general purpose clauses expressing concern for the welfare of the
family and the child, although the Juvenile Court Judges Model speaks
exclusively of the latter;
2. enumerated standards for the court's consideration in termination of
parental rights;
3. requirements of proof of the provision of supportive service in an
attempt to rehabilitate the family prior to termination; and
4. child preference clauses.
Substantial differences between the Virginia statute and the model
statutes are also apparent. The following characteristics of the models,
were they incorporated into the Virginia statute, would improve the law
63. ABA MODEL, supra note 38, § 1.4. See also In re Atwood, 2 Kan. App. 2d 680, -,
587 P.2d 1, 2 (1978)(holding that a child shall not be classed neglected solely because his
parents are on welfare) and State v. Robert H., 118 N.H. 713, -, 393 A.2d 1387, 1390
(1978) (noting this is not an ideal world, the court held that mere inadequate parenting with-
out specific harm to the child was insufficient to terminate parental rights).
64. The ABA Model statute provides a sixty day period of abandonment prior to termina-
tion, ABA MODEL, supra note 38, § 8.2(B)(1); the Juvenile Court Judges Model requires a
three month period, Juv. CT. JUDGES MODEL, supra note 37, § 12(4); and the Virginia statute
provides for a six month time lapse, VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(D)(2)(Cum. Supp. 1980).
65. ABA MODEL, supra note 38, § 8.3(A) & (B).
66. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(C) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
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on termination of parental rights in Virginia.
1. Include a poverty or cultural differences clause. Such inclusion would
be of assistance in eliminating class bias from the court's decision-making
process.6 7
2. Eliminate such terminology as "best interests of the child," thereby
avoiding a needless source of subjectivity and ambiguity.
3. Consider modified standards for termination which de-emphasize pa-
rental conduct and focus primarily on damage to the child. 8 This shift in
emphasis toward harm to the child is justified by the lack of sufficient
knowledge of "proper parenting" and the inability to predict the impact
of parental conduct on children. 9
4. Provide explicitly for the court's consideration of psychological
parenthood in termination proceedings.
70
Adoption of the last two provisions would signify major policy changes in
Virginia's statute on the termination of parental rights. At a minimum,
however, they merit serious study by the legislature.
67. Note, Termination of Parental Rights - Suggested Reforms and Responses, 16 J.
FAM. L. 239, 248 (1977-78). See also In re Atwood, 2 Kan. App.2d 680, -, 587 P.2d 1, 2
(1978).
Many interests of the child are better served by more affluent substitute parents, "but
that doesn't mean the natural parent is unfit for custody." Rocka v. Roanoke County Dep't
of Pub. Welfare, 215 Va. 515, 518, 211 S.E.2d 76, 78 (1975).
68. State v. Robert H., 118 N.H. 713, -, 393 A.2d 1387, 1389 (1978)(stating that the
grounds for termination in New Hampshire's statute lacked adequate focus on specific harm
to the children). See also Note, Due Process and the Fundamental Right to Family Integ-
rity: A Re-evaluation of South Dakota's Parental Termination Statute, 24 S.D.L. REV. 447,
463 (1979).
An effective argument is made for eliminating all references to parental conduct in Note,
State Intrusion into Family Affairs: Justifications and Limitations, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1383
(1974). See also ABA MODEL, supra note 38.
69. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Search for Realistic
Standards, 27 STAN, L. REV. 985, 1017 (1975).
70. See Juv. CT. JUDGES MODEL, supra note 37, § 12(3) which provides that "the Court
shall in proceedings concerning the termination of parental rights ... consider whether said
child has become integrated into the foster family to the extent that his familial identity is
with that family."
For a thorough discussion of the psychological parent-child relationship, see J. GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 6. For suggested statutory time periods for determining a child's entitlement to
remain with long time caretakers, see J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, and A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 46-48 (1979).
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO TERMINATION STATUTES - WILL
VIRGINIA'S STATUTE SURVIVE SUCH ATTACKS?
Recent judicial decisions such as Davis v. Smith,7' Roe v. Conn,72 and
Alsager v. District Court" have overturned termination statutes on con-
stitutional grounds. The two most significant constitutional issues raised
by these decisions are substantive due process and the void for vagueness
doctrine.74 The vulnerability of Virginia's statute to these issues may be
examined, although as yet no Virginia cases have dealt with constitu-
tional challenges to Virginia's statute authorizing termination of parental
rights.
In order to assess the merits of any substantive due process challenge,
it is essential to examine the constitutional nature of the rights at stake.
Although three parties are involved in termination actions and each has a
right at stake, in constitutional parlance it is the right to family integrity
which is at stake. Through a plethora of decisions the United States Su-
preme Court has established the fundamental right of family relation-
ships. In the seminal case of Meyer v. Nebraska,75 which invalidated a
state statute that prohibited the teaching of any modern foreign language
71. __ Ark. -, 583 S.W.2d 37 (1979).
72. 417 F. Supp. 769 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
73. 406 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1975), afl'd, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976).
74. Procedural due process issues have also been raised. They are beyond the scope of
this article; however, it is noted briefly that procedural rights in termination proceedings
arguably should be concomitant with the procedural due process accorded juvenile delin-
quency proceedings. These rights include the right to counsel, the burden of proof, adequate
notice, and the right of confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. See McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1 (1967).
For discussion of burden of proof required in termination, see Alsager v. District Court,
406 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1975), affd, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976); In re Angelia M.P.,
106 Cal. App. 3d 42, 164 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1980) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt); In re
Heidi T., 87 Cal. App. 3d 864, 151 Cal. Rptr. 263 (1978); In re Custody of Minor,
-Mass.-, 389 N.E.2d 68 (1979); State v. Metteer, 203 Neb. 515, 279 N.W.2d 374
(1979); In re GM, 396 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1980) (clear and convincing proof). See also VA.
CODE ANN. § 16.1-283 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
In termination proceedings, the right to counsel has been widely recognized. See In re
Otis, 6 FAM. L. REP. 2068, cert. granted, 444 U.S. 924 (1979); Davis v. Page, 618 F.2d 374
(5th Cir. 1980) (rehearing en banc granted July 8, 1980); Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769
(M.D. Ala. 1976); In re Heidi T., 87 Cal. App. 3d 864, 151 Cal. Rptr. 263 (1978); In re J.Z.,
190 N.W.2d 27 (N.D. 1971). See also VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-266 (Cum.Supp. 1980).
The rights to adequate notice and cross-examination have also been recognized. See, e.g.,
Alsager v. District Court, 406 F. Supp. 10, 20 (S.D. Iowa 1975), afl'd, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir.
1976).
75. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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prior to ninth grade, the Supreme Court determined that the "liberty"
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment includes the right of the indi-
vidual "to marry, establish a home and bring up children." 76 Similarly, in
Prince v. Massachusetts the Court stated: "It is cardinal with us that the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents. .. ."
More recently, in Quilloin v. Walcott, the Court stated that it is estab-
lished that the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally
protected.78 Additionally, in Stanley v. Illinois the Supreme Court, in
declaring Illinois' dependency statute unconstitutional for depriving un-
married fathers of the custody of their natural children upon the death of
their mother, acknowledged that "the integrity of the family unit has
found protection in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.... ."8o Certainly, no doubt remains that parents "possess a funda-
mental 'liberty' and 'privacy' interest in maintaining the integrity of their
family unit."""
Substantive due process prohibits governmental interference with a
person's right to life, liberty or property by unreasonable legislation.
When the interest impinged upon is a fundamental right, it may not be
interfered with in the absence of a compelling state interest and a show-
ing that no less drastic means are available to further the public inter-
est.8 2 These limitations are often referred to as the strict scrutiny test.
The burden of proof is placed on the state to show 1) a compelling state
interest and 2) no less drastic alternative is available to accomplish its
goal.
In Alsager five or six children were removed from their home, although
the evidence revealed only that the parents allowed them to annoy neigh-
bors and play in traffic, and that the house contained dirty dishes and
76. Id. at 399.
77. 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (emphasis added).
78. 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978).
79. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). See also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). Although a consti-
tutional due process challenge to procedures for voluntary commitment of infants to state
mental hospitals, Parham recognizes the concept of family integrity with broad parental
authority which ought to be easily tranferred to some agency or officer of the State. Id. at
601-04. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965);
Kruse v. Campbell, 431 F. Supp. 180 (E.D. Va.), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
434 U.S. 808 (1977) (Although this case concerned the practice of placing handicapped chil-
dren in foster care primarily to receive funding for their special education rather than termi-
nation, the court did recognize the fundamental right to family integrity).
80. 405 U.S. at 651.
81. Alsager v. District Court, 406 F. Supp. 10, 16 (S.D. Iowa 1975), af'd, 545 F.2d 1137
(8th Cir. 1976).
82. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
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laundry. The termination petition alleged in statutory terms:
The best interests of the children require . . . [termination] by the Court
because said parents have substantially and continuously . . . refused to
give their children necessary parental care and protection and because said
parents are unfit parents by reason of conduct detrimental to the physical
or mental health or morals of their children.83
The contention in Roe v. Conn was that a home for a white child in a
black neighborhood fitted the statutory term "improper home" and was
grounds for termination of parental rights.8 4 In both cases the courts
found that their state's termination statute failed to meet the compelling
state interest test. It is suggested that the "state's interest . . . would
become 'compelling' enough to sever entirely the parent-child relation-
ship only when the child is subjected to real physical or emotional
harm.""5 The Alsager decision indicates that, on its own merits "the best
interests of the child" fails the due process requirement of a compelling
state interest. Rather "[tihe pivotal issue is whether the child is subject
to substantial physical or emotional harm that would be more devastating
than would termination. .... s
Based upon the above reasoning, subsection B of Virginia's statute
7
should survive any substantive due process challenge. The statute's stan-
dard of "serious and substantial threat to [the child's] life, health or de-
velopment"88 clearly satisfies the compelling state interest as delineated
by Alsager and Conn. However, subsection C8 speaks only in terms of
best interests of the child and parental conduct. Whether this subsection
would satisfy a compelling state interest test is unclear. The best remedy
would be to amend subsection C in terms addressing the specific harm to
the child. However, the subsection might also be saved by the argument
that the unstated purpose behind subsection C, "the avoidance of lasting
psychological harm to the child, is the compelling state interest behind
prompt severance of the parental relationship." 90 The least drastic alter-
native component of the substantive due process test is amply met
through the Virginia statutory requirements for supportive services for
83. 406 F. Supp. 10 at 13-14.
84. Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
85. Alsager v. District Court, 406 F. Supp. 10, 23 (S.D. Iowa 1975), aff'd, 545 F.2d 1137
(8th Cir. 1976).
86. Note, Due Process and the Fundamental Right to Family Integrity: A Re-evaluation
of South Dakota's Parental Termination Statute, 24 S.D.L. REv. 447, 453 (1979).
87. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(B) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
88. Id. § 16.1-283(B)(1).
89. Id. § 16.1-283(C).
90. In re David B., 91 Cal. App. 3d 184, 196, 154 Cal. Rptr. 63, 71 (1979).
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rehabilitation and the necessity to prove that there is no reasonable likeli-
hood the condition which resulted in abuse or neglect and/or foster care
can be substantially corrected or eliminated within a reasonable period of
time.91 Thus, with the possible exception of subsection C, it appears Vir-
ginia's statute would survive a substantive due process challenge.
Likewise, Virginia's statute should withstand challenges based upon the
void for vagueness doctrine. The void for vagueness doctrine establishes
"that a law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it
is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the
conduct it prohibits or leaves judges and jurors free to decid;, without
any legally fixed standards. ... " The doctrine has been criticized for
its imprecision. In fact, it seems to be less a principle regulating permissi-
ble relationships between written law and potential offender than it is a
practical instrument mediating between "all the organs of public coercion
of a state and. . . the institution of federal protection of the individual's
private interests."93 One commentator has therefore suggested that there
is usually no voiding of a statute for vagueness unless "the individual
challenging the statute is indeed one of the entrapped innocent, and that
it would have been practical for the legislature to draft more precisely.
9 4
The United States Supreme Court has identified three inherent dangers
in vague laws: the absence of fair warning, the impermissible delegation
of discretion leading to subjective and arbitrary decisions, and the undue
inhibitions of the exercise of a constitutional right. 5
In Davis v. Smith, the Arkansas Supreme Court declared void one sec-
tion of the Arkansas termination statute which read "the parents are...
unable to provide a proper home for the children."9' 6 The court found that
the term "a proper home" did not convey sufficient warning when mea-
sured by common understanding and "would permit such a wide latitude
for interpretation that its meaning would vary widely among judges
... ."9 Similar language in the Alabama statute was found unconstitu-
tionally vague for lack of fair warning by the Conn court, which stated in
part: "When is a home an 'unfit' or 'improper' place for a child? Obvi-
91. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(B)(2) and (C)(l)-(2)(Cum. Supp. 1980).
92. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03 (1966). For an extensive discussion of
the void for vagueness doctrine see Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960) [hereinafter cited as The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine].
See also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
93. The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine, supra note 92, at 81 (emphasis in original).
94. L. TRME, AmERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 719 (1978).
95. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972).
96. ___Ark-- , , 583 S.W.2d 37, 39-40 (1979).
97. Id. at -, 583 S.W.2d at 43.
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ously, this is a question about which men and women of ordinary intelli-
gence would greatly disagree. Their answers would vary in large measure
in relation to their differing social, ethical, and religious views."9' On the
same note, "the standards of 'necessary parental care and protection,'
§ 232.41(2)(b), and of '[parental] conduct. . . detrimental to the physical
or mental health or morals of the child,' § 232.41(2)(d),"9 s found in the
Iowa termination statute were declared unconstitutionally vague in Al-
sager for want of fair warning, for arbitrariness because the termination
decision would turn upon which state officials were involved in the case,
and for serving "to inhibit parents in the exercise of their fundamental
right to family integrity."'100
On the other hand, Virginia's termination statute does not speak in
terms of "proper home," "improper home" or any conduct detrimental to
the physical or mental health of the child. Rather, Virginia's statute sets
up a general, albeit rather vague standard, termination in "the best inter-
ests of the child," 01 and then it quite specifically requires- that the neg-
lect or abuse suffered must present a serious and substantial threat to
the child's life, health or development.' 0° That a decision based solely on
the "best interests of the child" would be void for vagueness is a distinct
possibility.' 0 However, since the Virginia statute joins "the best interests
98. Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769, 780 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
99. Alsager v. District Court, 406 F. Supp. 10, 18 (S.D. Iowa 1975), afl'd, 545 F.2d 1137
(8th Cir. 1976)(brackets in the original).
100. Id. at 19. Contra, State v. Metteer, 203 Neb. 515, 279 N.W.2d 374, 377 (1979); In re
Keyes, 574 P.2d 1026, 1029 (Okla. 1977)(while the majority upheld the statute, a strong
dissent called the statute virtually identical to the statute struck down in Alsager and sug-
gested that the facts of the case, sexual abuse of a young child, overwhelmed the majority's
application of law. Id. at 1034).
In Alsager the issue of vagueness was not decided by the circuit court. Rather, the court
affirmed, overturning the statute, on substantive due process grounds. However, the circuit
court did note that the vagueness attack was a serious one but, in the interest of comity,
afforded "the Iowa courts an additional opportunity to give the statutory provisions a
plainly desirable limiting construction." Alsager v. District Court, 545 F.2d 1137, 1138 (8th
Cir. 1976).
101. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(B)(Cum. Supp. 1980).
102. Id. § 16.1-283(B)(1).
103. A statute's vagueness may be remedied by sufficiently narrowing judicial construc-
tion. In Rocka and Berrien there was no constitutional challenge but the Virginia Supreme
Court did state that a showing of best interests of the child alone was not enough for termi-
nation of parental rights. The standard set was one of best interest of the child and parental
unfitness. These decisions could be interpreted as giving a plainly desirable limiting con-
struction to the statutory use of "best interests of the child." Such interpretation would
nullify any void for vagueness challenge. See generally The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine,
supra note 92.
The United States Supreme Court recently granted review on the question of void for
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of the child" standard conjunctively with "a serious and substantial
threat to [the child's] life, health or development,' 10  a void for vagueness
challenge would most probably be unsuccessful.
The termination statutes of other states written in terms of serious
harm to the child have survived void for vagueness attacks. 05 In fact, the
majority of courts have upheld termination statutes challenged under the
void for vagueness doctrine.106 The difference in the court decisions can
be explained in the specificity of standards required. In Davis v. Smith
0 7
the'court suggests three levels of specificity. First, a requirement of strict
specificity is imposed upon criminal statutes because, where personal lib-
erty is at stake, the basic policy must not be left to arbitrary and subjec-
tive application of police or courts. Secondly, an intermediate level of
specificity is proposed for termination statutes "because any parent
should have some basic understanding of his obligations to his children,
but many cannot be as alert to, and aware of, prevailing practices basic to
establishment of standards as those engaging in business would likely be
to settled and well understood standards and practices." 08 And finally, a
lowest tier of specificity would be required of statutes regulating busi-
ness.'09 Requiring a middle ground of specificity in statutory language
would permit statutes, such as Virginia's, with a standard related to seri-
ous and substantial harm to survive void for vagueness challenges,
whereas statutes such as those described in Davis, Conn, and Alsager
would not survive. On the other hand, if a test of strict specificity in the
language is applied, few of the present statutes would survive a constitu-
vagueness in a state statute which permitted termination of parental rights if parents are
"unfit." In re Five Minor Children, - Del. -, 407 A.2d 198 (1979), cert. granted sub
noma. Doe v. Delaware, 100 S. Ct. 1336 (1980). The appeal filed with the Court also raises the
questions of whether the burden of proof may be less than clear and convincing and whether
a compelling state interest showing is necessary for termination of parental rights. [1980] 6
FAM. L. REP. 2344.
104. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(B)(1) (Cure. Supp. 1980).
105. In re J.T., 40 Cal. App. 3d 633, 115 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1974); State v. Metteer, 203 Neb.
515, 279 N.W. 2d 374 (1979); State v. McMaster, 259 Or. 291, 486 P.2d 567 (1971); Sanchez
v. Texas Dep't of Human Resources, 581 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
106. See note 105 supra. Accord, In re V.A.E.Y.H.D., -Colo -, 605 P.2d 916
(1980); In re J.Z., 190 N.W.2d 27 (N.D. 1971); In re Keyes, 574 P.2d 1026 (Okla. 1977); In re
B.E., SD-.. 287 N.W.2d 91 (1979).
107. ____Ark._., 583 S.W.2d 37 (1979).
108. Id. at 41-42. Cf. Day, Termination of Parental Rights Statutes and the Void for
Vagueness Doctrine: A Successful Attack on the Parens Patriae Rationale, 16 J. FAM. L.
213, 237 (1977-78). Professor Day contends that there is a two-tier test and that Alsager and
Conn, applying the higher level, overturned the statutes, while McMaster, employing the
lower level, upheld the Oregon statute.
109. Id.
1980] 229
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
tional challenge under the void for vagueness doctrine.
V. CONCLUSION
The central issue in the termination of parental rights continues to be
the balance of interests in the affected trilogy: the parents, the children,
and the state. Virginia's termination statute, while maintaining the phi-
losophy of limited state intervention, has redefined the relative postures
of the parent and child.
Previously, the child's interests were obscured in the term "best inter-
ests of the child," which the courts had determined most often lay with
the natural parents. While Virginia's new statute does not eliminate this
terminology, it does set forth more specific standards, demonstrating an
increased awareness of the needs of the child. Prompt and final determi-
nations are sought. Severe harm to the child's life, health or development
is a standard for termination. At the same time, parental rights remain
respected and protected. Termination is to be considered only after ap-
propriate rehabilitative services have been offered and it is ascertained
that there is no reasonable likelihood of reforming the conditions leading
to placement.
In establishing more specific guidelines for the termination of parental
rights, Virginia's new statute generally follows the pattern of the model
statutes and avoids the pitfalls leading to constitutional attack. However,
standards with a greater emphasis on harms to the child are desirable.
Because the state's role in the termination process is that of guardian and
not that of affirmative intervenor or moral censor of parent conduct, the
emphasis on such conduct seems misplaced.
Nonetheless, Virginia's new termination statute does provide effective
guidelines which should help to assure that state intervention win "truly
serve a family or child rather than ill-defined historic concepts or an offi-
cial's personal notions of proper childrearing.'11°
Barbara M. Rose
110. Note, State Intrusion Into Family Affairs: Justifications and Limitations, 26 STAN.
L. RE v. 1383, 1409 (1974).
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